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DAVID KING 
Introduction 
In  'Meaning:  An  mtersellllolIc  perspective',  Ruthrof argues  that  the 
entirety of human experience can be construed in terms of sign systems. 
Following Peirce, who maintains that we  think only in signs, he says: 
... reality is  the result of the corroboration of one system by at  least  one other 
sign system. Or, more simply, reality occurs when signs from different significatory 
systems support one another. (Ruthrof 1995:  25) 
In my  opinion,  Ruthrof's theory of sign  systems  is  highly  persuasive, 
There are, however,  ethical  considerations arising from it  that I  think 
need discussing, If what I have to say in the following is cogent, we shall 
find ourselves faced with a choice: either reject Ruthrof's theory of signs, 
or profoundly revise our attitudes with regard to art. Given the persua-
siveness of Ruthrof's theory,' I shall be urging the latter, 
Ethical Considerations 
According to  Ruthrof's realist textualism,  the fact  that the entirety of 
experience can be expressed in terms of  sign systems means that ultimately 
there can be differences only of degree between anyone given sign 'sub-
system' and another. By 'differences only of  degree' between sign-systems, 
I mean that there are no signs that are wholly separate from other signs, 
In this regard, Ruthrof refers to the well-known position of Eco: 
[Eca] draws  our attention to the point that one could unravel  the  total of signs 
of any culture by beginning with [one] sign and following its myriad interconnec-
tions, (Ruthrof 1995: 38) 
To  use  one of Ruthrof's examples, while 'the hole in the tooth felt  by 
the  tip  of the  tongue is  quite  different from  the  'same' hole seen  in  a 
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dentist's mirror' (Ruthrof 1995: 31), the mere fact that we can talk about 
the difference between the two  perceptions of the holes implies the exis-
tence of a common textual framework according to which the two experi-
ences can be compared. There is thus no absolute difference between the 
one sign-system and the other. 
Problems arise, however, when  we  move into the realm  of art - for 
example, fiction. Consider, on the one hand, the murder of a real person, 
such as Sharon Tate, and the murder of a fictional person, such as Roger 
Ackroyd (in Agatha Christie's novel). Traditionally, of course, the view 
has been that there can be no objection to fictional accounts of murder2 _ 
precisely  because they  are  fictional, that is, non-real.  But if Ruthrof is 
right, we are no longer justified in drawing a sharp dividing line between 
fiction  and  nonfiction.  In  the  case  of both  Sharon  Tate  and  Roger 
Ackroyd, for example, similar kinds of information are available: we can 
obtain information as  to the appearance of both Tate and Ackroyd; we 
can obtain information as  to  the  tastes of both persons; we can situate 
both  with  regard  to  other  individuals  and  events.  In  short,  we  can 
compare the two.  Granted,  the  sort of interaction  between  a  fictional 
world  and what,  to  use  Husserl's  term,  we  could call  the  lifeworld,  is 
limited;  but as  in  the  example of the tooth, the mere fact  that we  can 
compare these two murders means that they have something in common, 
and are thus not different in any absolute ontological sense.3  Characters 
in novels may be only fictional,  but the fact that they are composed of 
the same  'stuff' - signs - as  'real' people means  that we  need  to  be 
careful with regard to them
4 
And, in fact, the obvious ethical question now becomes: is it therefore 
wrong  to  write  murder stories? As  I  pointed  out in Note 2,  moralists 
have objected to such stories, precisely because of  a supposed 'corrupting' 
effect on the reader. Now murder stories mayor may not have a corrupt-
ing  effect,  but this  is  not  the  moral  problem  that I  see  arising  from 
Ruthrof's theory. The moral problem I see arising is, rather, this: in that 
the writers of murder stories are responsible for the events  that unfold 
in  their works,  to what extent can the writers be said to be responsible 
for murder? In a nutshell,  was  Agatha Christie a  criminal?  An  added 
complication here is  that according to Ruthrof's theory - particularly 
as expounded in  the early The Reader's Construction of  Narrative (which 
draws on the ideas of such theorists as Ingarden and Iser) - the reader 
himself is part-author of the text. If this is so, then the reader, too, must 
assume a certain amount of any guilt,  merely by  virtue of reading and 
partly bringing into being ('concretizing' is Ingarden's term) the literary 
work. One could perhaps see here a semiotic justification for the Biblical 
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Ruthrof does go  some way  towards providing a means of resolving 
this problem. Consider the following passage: 
The visual image of a tree is meaningful because it can be and has been corrobo-
rated  by  tactile  and  other  significations.  I am  able  to  recognize  by  touch,  Le., 
classify as  a meaningful part of a set of experiences, a bolt underneath my car's 
gearbox even if I cannot see it because the tactile signification is corroborated by 
recollected  visual signs (bolt-signs), as well as other signs. (Ruthrof 1995: 25) 
Given this, I imagine Ruthrofwould say that because the signs we receive 
from a murder story are of one kind only - the kind formed by words 
on a page - there is  insufficient corroboration with other sign-systems 
for the fictional murder to be considered on a par with the 'real' murder. 
I  think,  however,  that Ruthrof would  admit that the difference  is  still 
only of degree.  But if so,  this leads to further moral complications. It 
leads, for example, to the conclusion that it is less  wrong to murder an 
unknown person, such as a vagrant, than it is to murder someone in the 
public eye - precisely because there are fewer linkages between the sign-
systems of the world and the sign-system of the vagrant than there are 
between the sign-systems of the world and the sign-system of the person 
in the public eye.  (I say  that this  is  a complication,  but, of course,  in 
practice the murder of a person in the public eye,  such as  a celebrity, 
generally  is  dealt  with  more  severely  than  the  murder  of a  vagrant.) 
Moreover, if writing a murder story turns out to be a peccadillo rather 
than a genuine crime, we are still in the nncomfortable position of  having 
to justify  committing  a  peccadillo.  Wouldn't  we  be  on morally  safer 
ground if we  simply chose not to write murder stories at all?  Reading 
murder stories, after all, is not necessary for our survival. 
One could, perhaps, argue along utilitarian lines here, suggesting that 
the  pleasure  given  to  many  people  by  murder  stories  outweighs  any 
nebulous transgression against fictional persons. I don't think, however, 
that  this  is  a  very  helpful  answer,  precisely  because  it  invites  all  the 
criticisms that can be directed at utilitarianism itself (the violation of the 
rights of minorities, etc.). I think a better answer is simply to argue that 
no matter what we  do,  we  cannot help  harming people  - fictional  or 
otherwise. Let me explain. 
A short while ago, cognizant of the ethical problems with sign systems 
I have been describing, I attempted to write a story, 'Cry on your smile', 
in which absolutely nothing unpleasant happens to the characters. In the 
very first paragraph, for example, I have the central character unearth a 
gold ingot in his  back yard; later he is offered sex at just the moment he 
wants it, etc. For a while, it seemed to me that my attempt had succeeded. 
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must first  have  been  the  desire  itself _ ..  that is,  a  lack.  And lacks,  by 
their very nature, are unpleasant. I soon realized that what I was  really 
doing  when  I  was  trying  to  write  a  story  where  nothing  unpleasant 
happens is attempting to seize presence (in the Derridean sense). I wanted 
presence (pleasure) without concomitant absence (desire). But signs, by 
their very nature, are characterized by  absence.  As  Derrida reminds us 
in 'Differance', all presence is  deferred,  is  available only as  a  trace.  In 
my story's terms: if finding one gold ingot in the garden is good, wouldn't 
finding two be better? And wouldn't three be better than two? Logically, 
my character would have had to find  an infinite number of ingots in his 
garden ._- and that, sadly,  is  simply not possible. The world is  not like 
that. It  mayor may not be a vale of tears, but it is certainly a vale of  signs. 
Nietzsche was aware of this when he discussed the position of a human 
being's  eyes  and  noted  that  they  are  destined  to  perform  an  act  of 
exclusion.  (If we  look  at  something,  we  are  thereby  not  looking  at 
something else.)  An ethical  example  would be  that if we  give  all  our 
money to one charity, we are simultaneously not giving all our money to 
the  other charities.  Utilitarianism urges  us  constantly to consider how 
good is  allocated by our actions, but semiotics reveals that every single 
one of our actions - conscious and unconscious - would properly have 
to be evaluated. 
There is,  however, still the point that we  can get by without reading 
murder  stories.  We  can  certainly  get  by  without  watching films  with 
extreme violence - and fihns,  by virtue of the fact that they employ a 
greater number of sign  systems than do novels,  are clearly  much more 
morally suspect than novels.  So if we were to reject those literary works 
that  harm  their  characters,  how  much  of literature  would  we  lose? 
Certainly all of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy: in Anna Karenin, for example, 
virtually none of the characters - except Levin - escapes wretchedness. 
On the  other hand,  we  would retain  Jane  Austen,  for  her characters 
generally do to one another nothing that we  should object to  in  'real 
life'.  Perhaps surprisingly, while  we  would lose the Odyssey,  we  would 
retain Joyce's  Ulysses,  for one advantage of a novel in which there are 
no real events is  that there are no events that actually harm any of the 
characters.
5 Science fiction novels such as 200  I: A Space Odyssey likewise 
would be admissible - as  would any novel or story concerned with the 
exploration of ideas rather than with subjecting characters to unpleasant-
ness. The stories of Borges and Calvino would fall into this category. 
The above may seem an outrageously reductive dismissal of the canoni~ 
cal figures  in  Western literature;  but as  I see it,  we have no real choice. 
I do not for one minute expect that the present article will  lead to the 
abolition of murder stories; but if we are to be consistent, the only other -
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option (apart from  paying  mere  lip-service  to  Ruthrof's theory)  is  to 
dismiss the idea of a textual reality itself. 
Notes 
1.  Ruthrof even  safeguards  himself from  the  charge  that his  system  is  vulnerable  to  a 
version of Russell's paradox. When he suggests that the totality of experience is, as it 
were,  the set of all signs, one could ask:  is  the set of all signs itself a sign? Just as  in 
Russell's  paradox,  answering  'yes'  and answering  'no' would  lead  to  contradiction. 
Ruthrof,  however,  anticipates  this  problem  by  saying:  'Non-signs  can of eourse  be 
stipulated as the general transcendental possibility for signs, withont themselves being 
knowable: a kind of non-semiotic nonmenon' (Ruthrof 1995: 25). In other words, the 
set of  all signs would be a non-sign, just as the set of  all sets is designated by mathemati-
cians to be not a 'set' but, rather, a 'proper class'. See, for example, Reinhardt (1974). 
2.  Strict churchmen, of course, have often objected  to  such fictions; but as will  be seen, 
the moral  issues  they raise are different from  those  that I see  arising from  a  textual 
theory of reality. 
3.  One concomitant of this  would seem  to be  the  redundancy of much  literary  theory. 
After all,  if we  are able to negotiate the (sign-composed) objects of the 'real' world 
without the benefit of theory, we should surely be  able to do  the same with the (sign-
composed) objects of fiction. 
4.  Perhaps Cartesian dualists would have grounds for maintaining that there is an absolute 
difference between people and fictional characters. Only people, after all,  have a sense 
of the 'I'. On  the  other hand - and I am  aware that this is  solipsistic - I  have no 
evidence for the 'I-ness' of other people anyway, so why should I be expected to make 
an arbitrary distinction between other people and fictional characters? 
5.  Of course,  if Ruthrof is  right  and  there  is  no  absolute  difference  between  onc sign 
system and another, then simply 'rejecting' literary works would not achieve anything 
in an absolute sense. The Odyssey, for example, would in  a certain way still be present, 
even if only as a trace, in works such as  Ulysses. But objecting to the rejection of  certain 
literary works on the grounds that they will always be present as a trace would be akin 
to saying that because a murderer cannot be considered apart from society, all of  society 
must be held responsible for the murder. As always, pragmatic considerations intervene. 
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